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Abstract
In this paper, we present three algebraic constructions of authentication codes with secrecy. The
codes have simple algebraic structures and are easy to implement. They are asymptotically optimal
with respect to certain bounds.
© 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The authentication model introduced by Simmons involves three parties: a transmitter,
a receiver, and an opponent. The transmitter wants to send a piece of information (called
a source state) to the receiver through a public communication channel. The transmitter
encodes a source state s into a message m = Ek(s) with an encoding rule Ek shared with
the receiver, and then sends m to the receiver through the channel. When m is received, the
receiver will check the authenticity of the message using the encoding rule Ek and recover
the source state. The encoding rule Ek is usually a mapping indexed by the parameter k,
where k is from a spaceK, which is called the key space. All the possible source states s
form the source state space S, and all possible messages m form the message spaceM.
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Each of the two spaces S and K is associated with a probability distribution. In this
paper, we assume that both S and K have uniform probability distribution. We deﬁne
E= {Ek : k ∈K} and call it the encoding rule space. Its probability distribution depends
on that ofK and the design of the encoding algorithm Ek . If the mapping k → Ek is a
one-to-one correspondence fromK to E and all keys are equally likely, then all encoding
rules are equally likely. An authentication code is a four-tuple (S,K,M, Ek).
There are two types of authentication codes: authentication codes with secrecy and those
without secrecy. In an authentication code with secrecy, a source state s is hidden in the
encoded message m and one cannot recover s from m without knowledge of the secret
key or secret encoding rule Ek . In this case, the secret key k shared by the sender and
receiver is used for both secrecy and authentication purpose. In an authentication code
without secrecy, a source state is encoded into a message which is then sent to the receiver.
But in an authentication code without secrecy, the source state can be recovered from the
encoded message without knowledge of the secret key, and the secret key is used only for
authentication purpose. In this paper, we consider only authentication codes with secrecy.
It is possible that an encoding rule may map a source state onto more than one message
(this is called splitting). Here we consider only authentication codes without splitting.
Within this authentication model, we assume that an opponent can insert his message into
the channel, and can substitute anobservedmessagemwith anothermessagem′.Weconsider
two kinds of attacks, the impersonation and substitution attacks. In an impersonation attack,
an opponent inserts his message into the channel andwishes tomake the receiver accept it as
authentic. In a substitution attack, the opponent observed a message sent by the transmitter
and will replace it with his messagem′ 
= m, hoping that the receiver accepts it as authentic.
We use PI and PS to denote the maximum success probabilities with respect to the two
attacks.
Authentication codes with secrecy have been considered in [2,3,5,9,13,14,16–18]. Most
constructions are combinatorial. Authentication codes from combinatorial designs are in
general hard to implement. In this paper, we present three algebraic constructions of
authentication codes with secrecy. These codes are asymptotically optimal against both
impersonation and substitution attacks, and are easy to implement.
2. Bounds on authentication codes
In this section, we introduce some bounds on authentication codes that will be needed
in the sequel. To this end, we also useM, E, andS to denote the random variables of the
messages, encoding rules, and source states. For a positive integer r, we useMr to denote
the random variables of the ﬁrst r messages, and H(E |Mr ) the conditional entropy of E
given that the ﬁrst r messages have been observed.
The following is called the information-theoretic bound [10,13,15].
Lemma 1. In any authentication code,
PI2H(E |M)−H(E), PS2H(E |M
2)−H(E |M),
where the entropies are measured in bits.
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The following is called the combinatorial bound [8,12].
Lemma 2. In any authentication code without splitting,
PI
|S|
|M| and PS
|S | − 1
|M | − 1 .
If both equalities are achieved, then |E| |M|.
In the sequel, we shall show that the codes presented in this paper meet these bounds
asymptotically.
In this paper, the level of secrecy provided by an authentication code with secrecy is
deﬁned to be the uncertainty of the source statewhen the correspondingmessage is observed.
Thus, the amount of information leaked on the source state is equal to the original uncertainty
of the source state minus the uncertainty of the source state when one message is observed.
3. Some auxiliary results on character sums
In this section we introduce the basic concepts of character sums over ﬁnite ﬁelds, and
list bounds on two types of exponential sums. The reader is referred to [7] for a detailed
proof. We shall need these results when we construct authentication/secrecy codes in the
sequel.
Consider the ﬁnite ﬁeld GF(q), where q = ph, p is a prime, and h is a positive integer.
The absolute trace function Trq/p from GF(q) to GF(p) is deﬁned by
Trq/p(x)= x + xp + xp2 + · · · + xph−1 .
An additive character of GF(q) is a nonzero function  from GF(q) to the set of complex
numbers such that (x+ y)= (x)(y) for any pair (x, y) ∈ GF(q)2. For each b ∈ GF(q),
the function
b(c)= e2
√−1Trq/p(bc)/p for all c ∈ GF(q) (1)
deﬁnes an additive character of GF(q). When b = 0, 0(c) = 1 for all c ∈ GF(q), and is
called the trivial additive character of GF(q). The character 1 in (1) is called the canonical
additive character of GF(q).
A multiplicative character of GF(q) is a nonzero function  from GF(q)∗ to the set of
complex numbers such that (xy) = (x)(y) for all pairs (x, y) ∈ GF(q)∗ × GF(q)∗.
Let g be a ﬁxed primitive element of GF(q). For each j = 0, 1, . . . , q − 2, the function j
with
j (g
k)= e2
√−1jk/(q−1) for k = 0, 1, . . . , q − 2 (2)
deﬁnes a multiplicative character of GF(q).When j =0, 0(c)=1 for all c ∈ GF(q)∗, and
is called the trivial multiplicative character of GF(q).
Let q be odd and j = (q − 1)/2 in (2), we then get a multiplicative character  such
that (c)= 1 if c is the square of an element and (c)=−1 otherwise. This  is called the
quadratic character of GF(q).
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The additive (multiplicative) character of GF(q), when restricted to a subﬁeld of GF(q),
is also an additive (multiplicative) character. Furthermore, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let q be odd. Let  be the quadratic character ofGF(qn) and ′ be the quadratic
character of GF(q). For x ∈ GF(q), we have
(x)=
{
1 if n is even,
′(x) if n is odd.
Proof. Suppose g is a primitive element of GF(qn). Then g′ = g(qn−1)/(q−1) is a primitive
element of GF(q). We note that when q is odd, (qn − 1)/(q − 1)=∑n−1i=0 qi is even if and
only if n is even. The result follows. 
Let  be a multiplicative and  an additive character of GF(q). Then the Gaussian sum
G(, ) is deﬁned by
G(, )=
∑
c∈GF(q)∗
(c)(c).
We have
G(, )=
{
q − 1 for = 0, = 0,
−1 for = 0,  
= 0,
0 for  
= 0, = 0.
(3)
If  
= 0 and  
= 0, then |G(, )| = q1/2. If q = ph, where p is an odd prime and h is
a positive integer, then
G(, 1)=
{
(−1)h−1q1/2 if p ≡ 1 (mod 4),
(−1)h−1(√−1)hq1/2 if p ≡ 3(mod 4). (4)
We also have
G(, ab)= (a)G(, b) for a ∈ GF(q)∗, b ∈ GF(q). (5)
Let  be a nontrivial additive character of GF(q) and let the polynomial f ∈ GF(q)[x] be
of positive degree. Sums of the form
∑
c∈GF(q) (f (c)) are calledWeil sums.
Let  be a nontrivial additive character of GF(q)with q odd, and let f (x)=a2x2+a1x+
a0 ∈ GF(q)[x] with a2 
= 0. Then∑
c∈GF(q)
(f (c))= (a0 − a21(4a2)−1)(a2)G(, ). (6)
The following is referred to as Weil’s bound [7].
Lemma 4. Letf ∈ GF(q)[x] be of degreem1with gcd(m, q)=1 and let be a nontrivial
additive character of GF(q). Then∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
c∈GF(q)
(f (c))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (m− 1)q1/2.
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Let  be a nontrivial additive character of GF(qn) and let a, b ∈ GF(qn). Then the sum
K(; a, b)=
∑
x∈GF(qn)∗
(ax + bx−1)
is called a Kloosterman sum.
Lemma 5 (Lidl and Niederreiter [7]). If  is a nontrivial additive character of GF(qn)
and a, b ∈ GF(qn) are not both 0, then K(; a, b)2qn/2.
4. Construction I
Let q = ph, where p is an odd prime and h is a positive integer. Let Tr(x) be the trace
function from GF(qn) to GF(q). We useS,K,M, and E to denote the source state space,
key space, message space, and encoding rule space, respectively. Deﬁne
(S,K,M,E)= (GF(qn),GF(qn),GF(qn)× GF(q), {Ek | k ∈K}), (7)
where for any k ∈K and s ∈S,
Ek(s)= (s + k,Tr(sk)).
We denotem1= s+ k andm2=Tr(sk). The ﬁrst part is the encrypted message. The second
part m2 is the redundant part for authentication.
4.1. Impersonation attack
We assume that an opponent knows the structure of the system except the secret key k
or equivalently the corresponding encoding rule Ek . We now discuss the security of this
system with respect to impersonation attacks.
The impersonation attack is as follows.The opponent picks up an elementm=(m1,m2) ∈
M randomly or selects it in someway, and sends it to the receiver. The receiver will compute
s =m1 − k and Tr(sk). Then he will check whether Tr(sk)=m2. Hence
PI = max
m1,m2
|{k ∈ GF(qn) : Tr((m1 − k)k)=m2}|
qn
= max
b∈GF(q)
|{x ∈ GF(qn) : Tr(x2)= b}|
qn
.
For b ∈ GF(q), let N(b)= |{x ∈ GF(qn) : Tr(x2)= b}|. We use Trq/p to denote the trace
function from GF(q) to GF(p), Trqn/p to denote the trace function from GF(qn) to GF(p),
and  to denote a complex pth root of unity. Let  be the quadratic character of GF(qn) and
′ be the quadratic character of GF(q). Use  to denote the additive character of GF(qn)
and ′ to denote the additive character of GF(q). Use G to denote the Gaussian sum of
GF(qn) and G′ to denote the Gaussian sum of GF(q) (In the sequel, we will always use
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these notations.) Then
qN(b)=
∑
x∈GF(qn)
∑
y∈GF(q)
Trq/p[y(Tr(x2)−b)]
=
∑
y∈GF(q)
∑
x∈GF(qn)
Trq/p[y(Tr(x2)−b)]
= qn +
∑
y∈GF(q)∗
∑
x∈GF(qn)
Trq/p[y(Tr(x2)−b)]
= qn +
∑
y∈GF(q)∗
∑
x∈GF(qn)
Trq/p[Tr(yx2)−yb]
= qn +
∑
y∈GF(q)∗
Trq/p[−yb]
∑
x∈GF(qn)
Trqn/p[yx2]
= qn +
∑
y∈GF(q)∗
Trq/p[−yb](y)G(, 1) (by (6))
= qn +
∑
y∈GF(q)∗
′−b(y)(y)G(, 1)
=
{
qn +G(, 1)(−b)G′(, ′1) for b 
= 0 (by (5))
qn +G(, 1)
∑
y∈GF(q)∗(y) for b = 0
=


qn +G(, 1)G′(′0, ′1) for b 
= 0, n even
qn +G(, 1)′(−b)G′(′, ′1) for b 
= 0, n odd
qn +G(, 1)
∑
y∈GF(q)∗1 for b = 0, n even
qn +G(, 1)
∑
y∈GF(q)∗′(y) for b = 0, n odd
(by Lemma 3)
=


qn −G(, 1) for b 
= 0, n even (by (3))
qn +G(, 1)′(−b)G′(′, ′1) for b 
= 0, n odd
qn + (q − 1)G(, 1) for b = 0, n even
qn for b = 0, n odd.
From (4), we have
G(, 1)=
{
(−1)nh−1qn/2 if p ≡ 1(mod 4),
(−1)nh−1(√−1)nhqn/2 if p ≡ 3(mod 4)
and
G′(′, ′1)=
{
(−1)h−1q1/2 if p ≡ 1(mod 4),
(−1)h−1(√−1)hq1/2 if p ≡ 3(mod 4).
We compute PI by two cases: n is even and n is odd, respectively.
When n is even,
G(, 1)=
{−qn/2 if p ≡ 1(mod 4) or
if p ≡ 3(mod 4) and nh ≡ 0(mod 4),
qn/2 if p ≡ 3(mod 4) and nh ≡ 2(mod 4).
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So we have
qN(b)
=


qn + q n2 if b 
= 0, p ≡ 1(mod 4) or
if b 
= 0, p ≡ 3(mod 4) and nh ≡ 0(mod 4),
qn − (q − 1)q n2 if b = 0, p ≡ 1(mod 4) or
if b 
= 0, p ≡ 3(mod 4) and nh ≡ 0(mod 4),
qn − q n2 if b 
= 0, p ≡ 3(mod 4) and nh ≡ 2(mod 4),
qn + (q − 1)q n2 if b = 0, p ≡ 3(mod 4) and nh ≡ 2(mod 4).
(8)
It follows that
PI =


1
q
+ 1
q1+n/2 if p ≡ 1(mod 4) or
if p ≡ 3(mod 4) and nh ≡ 0(mod 4),
1
q
+ q−1
q1+n/2 if p ≡ 3(mod 4) and nh ≡ 2(mod 4).
When n is odd,
G(, 1)G
′(′, ′1)=±q
1+n
2 .
So we have
qN(b)=
{
qn ± q(n+1)/2 if b 
= 0,
qn if b = 0. (9)
It follows that PI = 1/q + 1/q(1+n)/2.
4.2. Substitution attack
An opponent has observed one message m= (m1,m2), where
m1 = s + k, m2 = Tr(sk). (10)
He wants to replace m with another message m′ = (m′1,m′2), where m1 
= m′1. Set 1 =
m′1 − m1 and 2 = m′2 − m2. Hence, substituting m with m′ is equivalent to adding an
element 1 
= 0 to m1, and an element 2 to m2. This is successful if and only if
Tr(sk)+ 2 = Tr((s + 1)k),
which is equivalent to Tr(1k)= 2. Hence
PS = max
m1,m2,1 
=0,2
|{k ∈ GF(qn)|Tr((m1 − k)k)=m2,Tr(1k)= 2}|
|{k ∈ GF(qn)|Tr((m1 − k)k)=m2}|
= max
u,v,a 
=0
|{x ∈ GF(qn) |Tr(x2)= u,Tr((x + a)2)= v}|
|{x ∈ GF(qn) |Tr(x2)= u}| .
For a ∈ GF(qn), u, v ∈ GF(q), let
N(u, v, a)= |{x ∈ GF(qn) |Tr(x2)= u,Tr((x + a)2)= v}|
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and
N(u)= |{x ∈ GF(qn) |Tr(x2)= u}|,
then
PS = max
u,v,a 
=0
N(u, v, a)
N(u)
. (11)
We now give a lower and upper bound on N(u, v, a) with the help of Weil’s bound (see
Lemma 4). Use the same notations as before, we have that
q2N(u, v, a)
=
∑
x∈GF(qn)
∑
y1,y2∈GF(q)
′1{y1[Tr(x2)− u] + y2[Tr((x + a)2 − v)]}
=
∑
y1,y2∈GF(q)
∑
x∈GF(qn)
′1(−y1u− y2v)1[(y1 + y2)x2 + 2ay2x + y2a2]
=
∑
x∈GF(qn)
1+
∑
y2∈GF(q)
∑
x∈GF(qn)
′1(y2u− y2v)1(2ay2x + y2a2)
+
∑
y1 
=−y2
∑
x∈GF(qn)
′1(−y1u− y2v)1[(y1 + y2)x2 + 2ay2x + y2a2]
= qn +
∑
y1 
=−y2
′1(−y1u− y2v)
∑
x∈GF(qn)
1[(y1 + y2)x2 + 2ay2x + y2a2].
By Lemma 4,
|q2N(u, v, a)− qn)|(q2 − q)(2− 1)qn/2 = (q2 − q)qn/2.
Hence
qn−1 − (q − 1)qn/2
q
N(u, v, a) q
n−1 + (q − 1)qn/2
q
. (12)
From (8) and (9), we have that
qn − (q − 1)qn/2
q
N(u) q
n + (q − 1)qn/2
q
. (13)
It follows from (11)–(13) that
PS
qn−1 + (q − 1)qn/2
qn − (q − 1)qn/2 .
Theorem 6. The authentication code of (7) provides at least log2[(qn − (q − 1)qn/2)/q]
bits of secrecy protection if n is even, and log2[(qn−q(n+1)/2)/q] bits of secrecy protection
if n is odd.
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Furthermore, we have
PI =


1
q
+ 1
q1+n/2 if n even, p ≡ 1(mod 4)
or p ≡ 3(mod 4) and nh ≡ 0(mod 4),
1
q
+ q−1
q1+n/2 if n even, p ≡ 3(mod 4) and nh ≡ 2(mod 4),
1
q
+ 1
q(1+n)/2 if n odd
(14)
and
PS
qn−1 + (q − 1)qn/2
qn − (q − 1)qn/2 . (15)
Proof. Suppose that a message (m1 = s + k,m2 = Tr(sk)) is known. We then have m2 =
Tr(s(m1 − s)). So the uncertainty of the source state is |{s |m2 = Tr(s(m1 − s))}|. The
uncertainty is at least log2 minb N(b). The result then follows from (8) and (9).
The conclusions about PI and PS were proved before. 
4.3. Optimality of the codes
We now prove that PS of the authentication code of (7) meets the lower bound of Lemma
2 asymptotically. The bound on PS given in Lemma 2 is Q = qn−1qn+1−1 . By (15), one can
easily verify that
lim
n→∞
Q
PS
= limn→∞Q
limn→∞ PS
= 1.
Clearly limn→∞ PI = 1/q.
5. Construction II
Let n be a positive integer. Let Tr(x) be the trace function from GF(qn) to GF(q). Deﬁne
(S,K,M,E)= (GF(qn)∗,GF(qn)∗,GF(qn)∗ × GF(q), {Ek | k ∈K}), (16)
where for any k ∈K and s ∈S,
Ek(s)= (sk,Tr(s + k)).
We denotem1= sk andm2=Tr(s+ k). The ﬁrst part is the encrypted message. The second
part m2 is the redundant part for authentication.
5.1. Secrecy protection
Suppose that one messagem= (m1,m2)= (sk,Tr(s+ k)) has been observed. This gives
certainly information about the source state s. In this case we want to know the uncertainty
of the source state.
We now derive a lower bound on the uncertainty of swhen one messagem= (m1,m2)=
(sk,Tr(s + k)) is observed. In this case, we have m2 = Tr(m1s−1 + s). For any m1 
= 0
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andm2, we need to know the number of solutions s to this equation. LetN(m1,m2) denote
this number. Then the uncertainty of s is log2N(m1,m2).
We now give a lower bound on N(m1,m2). Note that
qN(m1,m2)=
∑
x∈GF(qn)∗
∑
y∈GF(q)
Trq/p[y(Tr(m1x−1+x)−m2)]
=
∑
y∈GF(q)
∑
x∈GF(qn)∗
Trq/p[y(Tr(m1x−1+x)−m2)]
= qn − 1+
∑
y∈GF(q)∗
∑
x∈GF(qn)∗
Trq/p[y(Tr(m1x−1+x)−m2)]
= qn − 1+
∑
y∈GF(q)∗
Trq/p[−ym2]
∑
x∈GF(qn)∗
Trq/p[yTr(m1x−1+x)].
By Lemma 5,
∣∣qN(m1,m2)− (qn − 1)∣∣  ∑
y∈GF(q)∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈GF(qn)∗
Trq/p[yTr(m1x−1+x)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2(q − 1)qn/2.
Hence
−2(q − 1)qn/2 + qn − 1
q
N(m1,m2)
2(q − 1)qn/2 + qn − 1
q
. (17)
It follows that
log2N(m1,m2) log2
(
qn − 1− 2(q − 1)qn/2
q
)
.
This is the lower bound on the uncertainty of the source state s when one message is
observed.
5.2. Impersonation attack
We assume that an opponent knows the structure of the system except the secret key k
or equivalently the corresponding encoding rule Ek . We now discuss the security of this
system with respect to impersonation attacks.
The impersonation attack is as follows. The opponent selects an elementm= (m1,m2) ∈
M, and sends it to the receiver. The receiver will compute s =m1k−1 and Tr(s + k). Then
he will check whether Tr(s + k)=m2. This is successful if and only if
Tr(m1k−1 + k)=m2.
It is easily seen that the number of solutions k to this equation is also N(m1,m2). Hence
PI = Pr[Tr((m1k−1)+ Tr(k)=m2] = N(m1,m2)
qn − 1 .
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By the bounds on N(m1,m2), we have
PI
1
q
+ 2(q − 1)q
n/2
q(qn − 1) .
5.3. Substitution attack
An opponent has observed one message m= (m1,m2), where
m1 = sk, m2 = Tr(s + k). (18)
He wants to replace m with another message m′ = (m′1,m′2), where m1 
= m′1. This is
equivalent to multiplying an element 1 /∈ {0, 1} to m1, and adding an element 2 to m2.
This is successful if and only if
Tr(s + k)+ 2 = Tr(s1 + k),
which is equivalent to Tr[(1 − 1)s] = 2. Hence
PS = max
m1 
=0,m2,1 /∈{0,1},2
∣∣∣∣
{
k ∈ GF(qn)∗
∣∣∣∣
(
Tr(m1k−1 + k)=m2
Tr((1 − 1)m1k−1)= 2
)}∣∣∣∣
|{k ∈ GF(qn)∗ |Tr(m1k−1 + k)=m2}|
= max
a 
=0,b/∈{0,1}
∣∣∣∣
{
x ∈ GF(qn)∗
∣∣∣∣
(
Tr(ax−1 + x)= u
Tr(bx)= v
)}∣∣∣∣
|{x ∈ GF(qn)∗ |Tr(ax−1 + x)= u}| . (19)
Let N(a, b, u, v)= |{x ∈ GF(qn)∗ |Tr(ax−1 + x)= u,Tr(bx)= v}|, then
q2N(a, b, u, v)
=
∑
x∈GF(qn)∗
∑
y1,y2∈GF(q)
Trq/p{y1[Tr(ax−1+x)−u]+y2[Tr(bx)−v]}
=
∑
y1,y2∈GF(q)
∑
x∈GF(qn)∗
Trq/p{y1[Tr(ax−1+x)−u]+y2[Tr(bx)−v]}
= qn − 1+∑
y1,y2∈GF(q),(y1,y2)
=(0,0)
Trq/p(−y1u−y2v)
∑
x∈GF(qn)∗
Trq/p{y1[Tr(ax−1+x)]+y2[Tr(bx)]}
= qn − 1+∑
y1,y2∈GF(q),(y1,y2)
=(0,0)
Trq/p(−y1u−y2v)
∑
x∈GF(qn)∗
Trqn/p{y1ax−1+(y1+y2b)x}.
Since a 
= 0, b 
= 0, (y1, y2) 
= (0, 0), y1a and y1 + y2b cannot be 0 at the same time. So
we can apply Lemma 5 to get that
|q2N(a, b, u, v)− (qn − 1)|2(q2 − 1)qn/2.
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Hence
−2(q2 − 1)qn/2 + qn − 1
q2
N(a, b, u, v) 2(q
2 − 1)qn/2 + qn − 1
q2
. (20)
From (17), (19) and (20), we get that
PS
2(q2 − 1)qn/2 + qn − 1
q[−2(q − 1)qn/2 + qn − 1] . (21)
We have proved the following theorem.
Theorem 7. The authentication code of (16) provides at least
log2
(
qn − 1− 2(q − 1)qn/2
q
)
bits of secrecy protection. Furthermore, we have
PI
1
q
+ 2(q − 1)q
n/2
q(qn − 1)
and
PS
2(q2 − 1)qn/2 + qn − 1
q[−2(q − 1)qn/2 + qn − 1] .
5.4. Optimality of the codes
We now prove that PI and PS of authentication code (16) meet the lower bounds of
Lemma 2 asymptotically.
In the authentication code of (16), we have |S| = qn − 1 and |M| = q(qn − 1). So the
bound on PI given in Lemma 2 is P = 1/q. It is easily veriﬁed that
lim
n→∞
P
PI
= 1.
The bound on PS given in Lemma 2 isQ= (qn − 2)/(q(qn − 1)− 1). By (21) we have
lim
n→∞
Q
PS
= 1.
6. Construction III
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the general construction and then present two speciﬁc
constructions of authentication codes with secrecy using perfect nonlinear mappings.
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6.1. The general construction
Let (A,+) and (B,+) be two ﬁnite abelian groups, and let  be a mapping from A to
B. We construct an authentication code (S,K,M,E) by deﬁning
(S,K,M,E)= (A,A,A× B, {Ek | k ∈K}), (22)
where for any k ∈K and s ∈S,
Ek(s)= (s + k,(s)+(k)).
We denote m1 = s + k, and m2 =(s) +(k). The ﬁrst part is the encrypted message.
The second part m2 is the redundant part for authentication.
6.1.1. Impersonation attack
We assume that an opponent knows the structure of the system except the secret key k
or equivalently the corresponding encoding rule Ek . We now discuss the security of this
system with respect to impersonation attacks.
The impersonation attack is as follows.The opponent picks up an elementm=(m1,m2) ∈
M, and sends it to the receiver. The receiver will compute s = m1 − k and (s) +(k).
Then he will check whether(m1 − k)+(k)=m2. Hence
PI = max
m1,m2
Pr[(m1 − k)+(k)=m2]. (23)
6.1.2. Substitution attack
An opponent has observed one message m= (m1,m2), where
m1 = s + k, m2 =(s)+(k). (24)
He wants to replace m with another message m′ = (m′1,m′2), where m1 
= m′1. This is
equivalent to adding an element 1 
= 0 to m1, and an element 2 to m2. This is successful
if and only if
(s)+ k + 2 =(s + 1)+ k
which is equivalent to (s + 1)−(s)= 2. Note that one message (m1,m2) has been
observed. Whence
PS = max
1 
=0,2,
m1,m2
Pr[(s + 1)−(s)= 2 |m2 =(s)+(m1 − s)]. (25)
By (23) and (25), the probabilitiesPI andPS depend totally on themapping. In the sequel,
we construct codes by choosing proper mappings within this general framework.
6.2. First speciﬁc construction of codes in this family
Let f be a function from an abelian group (A,+) of order n to another abelian group
(B,+). The derivatives are deﬁned as Daf (x) = f (x + a) − f (x). A robust measure of
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the nonlinearity of functions is given by
Pf = max
0 
=a∈A maxb∈B Pr(Daf (x)= b), (26)
where Pr(E) denotes the probability of the occurrence of event E.
It is straightforward to see that Pf  1|B| . If the equality is achieved, we say that function
f : A→ B has perfect nonlinearity. In this case |B| must divide |A|.
Deﬁne a function(x) from GF(q)2t to GF(q) as
(x1, x2, . . . , x2t )= x1x2 + x3x4 + · · · + x2t−1x2t . (27)
Then has perfect nonlinearity.
The following lemma will be needed in the sequel [7, pp. 280–283].
Lemma 8. Let f be a nondegenerate quadratic form in n2 indeterminates over GF(q),
q odd. Then the number of solutions of the equation f (x1, . . . , xn) =b is{
qn−1 + (b)q(n−2)/2((−1)n/2	), n even,
qn−1 + q(n−1)/2((−1)(n−1)/2b	), n odd,
where 	= det(f ),  is the quadratic character of GF(q), and the function (x) is deﬁned
by (0)= q − 1 for (x)=−1 otherwise.
Theorem 9. Let  be the function of (27), and let (A,+) = (GF(q)2t ,+) and (B,+) =
(GF(q),+). Then the authentication code of (22) provides at least log2 (q2t−1− qt−1) bits
of secrecy protection. Furthermore, we have
PI = 1
q
+ q − 1
qt+1
, PS
qt−1 + q − 1
qt − q + 1 .
Proof. Weﬁrst determinePI. ByLemma8 the number of solutions of the quadratic equation
(x)=b is q2t−1+(b)qt−1, where (b)=−1 if b 
= 0 and (0)= (q−1).We distinguish
between two cases: odd q and even q. When q is odd, we can easily verify the following
expression from the deﬁnition of:
(m1 − e)+(e)=m2 ⇐⇒ (2e −m1)= 2m2 −(m1),
so we have
max
m1,m2
Pr[(m1 − e)+(e)=m2] = 1
q
+ q − 1
qt+1
.
When q is even, we have
max
m1=0,m2
Pr[(m1 − e)+(e)=m2] = 1
q
+ q − 1
qt+1
.
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For even q and m1 
= 0, since has perfect nonlinearity, we have
max
m1 
=0,m2
Pr[(m1 − e)+(e)=m2] = 1
q
.
Whether q is odd or even, we can get from (23), PI = 1q + q−1qt+1 .
We now develop the upper bound on PS. By (25),
PS = max
1 
=0,2
m1,m2
∣∣{s : (s)+(m1 − s)=m2,(s + 1)−(s)= 2}∣∣
|{s : (s)+(m1 − s)=m2}|

max 1 
=0,2
m1,m2
∣∣∣∣
{
s : (s)+(m1 − s)=m2
(s + 1)−(s)= 2
}∣∣∣∣
minm1,m2 |{s : (s)+(m1 − s)=m2}|
. (28)
We now derive an upper bound on the numerator and an lower bound on the denomi-
nator of the fraction above. Let m1 = (m1,1,m1,2, . . . , m1,2t ) ∈ GF(q)2t , and let 1 =
(1,1, 1,2, . . . , 1,2t ) be any nonzero element of GF(q)2t . We than have
(s)+(m1 − s)= 2
t∑
i=1
s2i−1s2i −
t∑
i=1
(m1,2i s2i−1 +m1,2i−1s2i )
+
t∑
i=1
m1,2i−1m1,2i
and
(s + 1)−(s)=
t∑
i=1
(1,2i s2i−1 + 1,2i−1s2i )−
t∑
i=1
1,2i−11,2i .
Without loss of generality, we assume that 1,2t−1 
= 0. Then from the equation (s +
1)−(s)=2 we can express s1,2t as a linear function of s1,1, . . . , s1,2t−1 plus a constant.
Substituting s1,2t in the equation(s)+(m1−s)=m2, we obtain a quadratic equation in
2t − 1 indeterminates, whose total number of solutions is the same as that of the following
set of equations:
(s)+(m1 − s)=m2, (s + 1)−(s)= 2.
Then it follows from Lemma 8 that
max
1 
=0,2
m1,m2
∣∣∣∣
{
s : (s)+(m1 − s)=m2
(s + 1)−(s)= 2
}∣∣∣∣ q2t−2 + (q − 1)qt−1. (29)
Note that
2
t∑
i=1
s2i−1s2i −
t∑
i=1
(m1,2i s2i−1 +m1,2i−1s2i )
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is a nondegenerate quadratic form in 2t indeterminates for any m1. By Lemma 8 again
min
m1,m2
|{s : (s)+(m1 − s)=m2}| q2t−1 − (q − 1)qt−1. (30)
Finally, the upper bound on PS follows from (28)–(30).
Finally, we analyze the level of secrecy provided by this authentication code. When a
message m= (m1 = s + k,m2 =(s)+(k)) is observed. We have
(s)+(m1 − s)=m2.
When m1 
= 0 and q is even, the number of solutions to this equation is q2t−1. In other
cases, the minimum number of solutions to this equation is q2t−1−qt−1. Hence, the secrecy
protection for the source state is at least log2 (q2t−1 − qt−1) bits. 
6.2.1. Optimality of the codes of Theorem 9
Clearly, PI = 1q + q−1qt+1 does not meet the lower bound on PI given in Lemma 2. We now
prove that it meets the bound on PI given in Lemma 1 asymptotically.
Clearly, H(E) = log2 q2t . We now compute H(E |M). Suppose that a message m =
(m1,m2) has been observed. Since all encoding rules and all source states are used with
equal probability, we can get the probability distribution of the messages. We distinguish
even q from odd q. When q is even,
m Uncertainty of e Probability of m Number of m
(0, 0) log2[q2t−1 + (q − 1)qt−1] q
2t−1+(q−1)qt−1
q4t
1
(0,m2 
= 0) log2[q2t−1 − qt−1] q
2t−1−qt−1
q4t
q − 1
(m1 
= 0,m2) log2[q2t−1] q
2t−1
q4t
(q2t − 1)q
So, we obtain
H(E |M)= q
2t−1 + (q − 1)qt−1
q4t
log2[q2t−1 + (q − 1)qt−1]
+ (q − 1)(q
2t−1 − qt−1)
q4t
log2[q2t−1 − qt−1]
+ (q
2t − 1)qq2t−1
q4t
log2[q2t−1].
Thus the bound on PI given in Lemma 1 is
Q : =2H(E |M)−H(E)
= [q
2t−1 + (q − 1)qt−1]
q2t−1+(q−1)qt−1
q4t [q2t−1 − qt−1]
(q−1)(q2t−1−qt−1)
q4t
q2t
× [q2t−1]
(q2t−1)qq2t−1
q4t .
It follows that limt→∞Q/PI = 1.
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Similarly, when q is odd, we have
m Uncertainty of e Probability of m Number of m
if(m1)= 2m2 log2 [q2t−1 + (q − 1)qt−1] q
2t−1+(q−1)qt−1
q4t
q2t
if(m1) 
= 2m2 log2 [q2t−1 − qt−1] q
2t−1−qt−1
q4t
q2t (q − 1)
In this case, we can also prove that PI asymptotically achieves the lower bound given in
Lemma 1. Similarly we can prove that PS asymptotically achieves the lower bound of
Lemma 1.
6.3. Second speciﬁc construction of codes in this family
Deﬁne (x)= TrGF(qn)/GF(q)(x2), where n is a positive integer, q is an odd prime, and
TrGF(qn)/GF(q) is the trace function. Since x2 is a perfect nonlinear mapping from GF(qn)
to itself, is a perfect nonlinear mapping from GF(qn) to GF(q).
Theorem 10. Let  = TrGF(qn)/GF(q)(x2), and let (A,+) = (GF(qn),+) and (B,+) =
(GF(q),+). Then the authentication code of (22) provides at least log2 (qn−1 − (q −
1)qn/2−1) bits of secrecy protection when n is even, and at least log2 (qn−1−q(n−1)/2) bits
of secrecy protection when n is odd. Furthermore, we have
PI =
{ 1
q
+ q−1
qn/2+1 or
1
q
+ 1
qn/2+1 if n even,
1
q
+ 1
q(n+1)/2 if n odd,
PS
qn/2−1 + (q − 1)
qn/2 − (q − 1) .
Proof. We ﬁrst compute PI. Combining (8), (9) and (23), we obtain
PI = max
m1,m2
Pr[(m1 − k)+(k)=m2]
=
{ 1
q
+ q−1
qn/2+1 or
1
q
+ 1
qn/2+1 if n even,
1
q
+ 1
q(n+1)/2 , if n odd.
It follows from (12) that the number of solutions to the following set of equations:
(s)+(m1 − s)= Tr(2s2 − 2m1s +m21)=m2,
(s)+ 1)−(s)= Tr(21s + 21)= 2
is at most (qn−1 + (q − 1)qn/2)/q, where 1 
= 0.
It follows from (8) that the number of solutions to the equation
(s)+(m1 − s)= Tr(2s2 − 2m1s +m21)=m2
is at least (qn − (q − 1)qn/2)/q.
Then the upper bound on PS follows from (28).
The statement about secrecy protection follows from (8) and (9). 
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Similarlywe can prove that the code ofTheorem10 is asymptotically optimalwith respect
to the bounds of Lemma 1.
6.3.1. More speciﬁc constructions of codes in this family
Deﬁne (x) = TrGF(pm)/GF(ph)(xs), where m and h are integers with 1h |m, p is an
odd prime, and TrGF(pm)/GF(ph) is the trace function. If
• s = pk + 1, where m/ gcd(m, k) is odd, or
• s = (3k + 1)/2, where p = 3, k is odd, and gcd(m, k)= 1,
then has perfect nonlinearity. Also the function
(x)= TrGF(pm)/GF(ph)(x10 + x6 − x2)
is perfect nonlinear when p = 3 and m is odd. These mappings give more authentication
codes with secrecy. However, computing the probabilities PI and PS is still open. For more
information on highly nonlinear functions we refer the reader to [1].
7. Concluding remarks
The ﬁrst two constructions of this paper are speciﬁc, while the third construction is
generic in the sense that any perfect nonlinear mapping may be employed to obtain au-
thentication codes with secrecy. Thus new functions with perfect nonlinearity give new
authentication/secrecy codes. The parameters of the codes presented in this paper are sum-
marized in Table 1 , where C1, C2, C3, and C4 denote the four classes of codes described
in this paper, and the lower bounds on PI and PS are from the combinatorial bounds of
Lemma 2.
Note that authentication codes with secrecy have six parameters. It is in general hard to
compare two classes of authentication codes with secrecy. All the codes presented in this
paper have the property that the size of the source state space is the same as that of the
encoding rule space, while in the codes constructed in [2–4,6,9,11,17–19]
• either the encoding rule space is much larger than the source state space, or
• the size of the source state space is not determined.
The levels of secrecy provided and the probabilities PI and PS are different. We have not
found any existing class of authentication codes that could be comparedwith those presented
in this paper in terms of goodness.
Finally, we mention that the constructions of this paper are related to those in [4]. But
in the constructions of this paper the size of the key space is the same as that of the source
state space, while in the codes in [4] the size of the key space is larger than that of the source
state space.
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Table 1
The parameters of the codes presented in this paper
|S|, |K| PI PS Secrecy in bits
1
q + 1q1+n/2 log2
qn−(q−1)qn/2
q
C1 qn 1q + q−1q1+n/2 
qn−1+(q−1)qn/2
qn−(q−1)qn/2 or
1
q + 1q(1+n)/2 log2
qn−q(n+1)/2
q
C2 qn − 1  1q + 2(q−1)q
n/2
q(qn−1) 
2(q2−1)qn/2+qn−1
q[−2(q−1)qn/2+qn−1] log2
qn−1−2(q−1)qn/2
q
C3 q2t 1q + q−1qt+1 
qt−1+q−1
qt−q+1 log2(q
2t−1 − qt−1)
1
q + q−1qn/2+1 log2
qn−(q−1)qn/2
q
C4 qn 1q + 1qn/2+1 
qn/2−1+(q−1)
qn/2−(q−1) or
1
q + 1q(n+1)/2 log2(q
n−1 − q(n−1)/2)
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